Internet of Things (IoT) deployments expand as IoT security lags. This article surveys IoT security protocols standardized by the Internet Engineering Task Force and discusses remaining gaps. Although these standardized IoT security protocols do not completely secure IoT devices, they go a long way.
In parallel, alarming recent reports in both academic work and mainstream media warn about potential cybervulnerabilities and actual cyberattacks involving the IoT. Increased awareness of the need for improved security is pushing legislators to pay closer attention to the IoT environment and issue new regulations, such as the first IoT cybersecurity law (SB-327) 16 and, more recently, the European Commission's Cybersecurity Act. 17 In this article, we focus on constrained IoT devices (described in RFC 7228 1 ) that are used in the realm of smart-home IoT deployments. Typically, constrained IoT devices use microcontrollers, for example Arm Cortex-M, that run on real-time operating systems such as FreeRTOS, RIOT, Micrium's µC/OS, or Mbed OS. 2 Compared to machines that run full-blown operating systems, such as Linux, constrained IoT devices use a fraction of the power and are equipped with random-access memory (RAM) and Flash sizes in the kilobyte range, reminiscent of the days of the Commodore VIC-20. Constrained IoT devices, which cannot afford the energy drain of Wi-Fi, connect to the network via low-power, wireless, link-layer technologies such as Bluetooth Low-Energy, IEEE 802.15.4, LoRa, 3GPP Cellular IoT (NB-IoT), or via wired buses such as BACnet or Ethernet.
Although E.U. initiatives such as IoT security recommendations from the E.U. Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) 3 are paving the way to a more secure IoT, reports of completely insecure IoT devices are still common. What causes companies to roll out products that are highly insecure? Is this the result of engineering design flaws, a lack of incentive for product management, or a combination of both?
THE IoT AND SECURITY AND PRIVACY
In this context, we survey the coverage of the Internet Protocol (IP) specifications for network security standardized by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and examine the extent to which they address the ENISA recommendations for IoT security. We focus on the IETF because 1) it has successfully standardized many of the other IPs that underpin the Internet at large; 2) the IETF protocol standards aim to work across the various IoT link-layer technologies, as well as to interoperate between different vendors; and 3) IETF specifications are open and freely available, which enables us to analyze existing work, contrary to the diverse proprietary technologies available on the market.
In the IoT security domain, the IETF positions itself within a larger ensemble of standardization bodies, gathering industry groups and organizations such as the IEEE, Open Mobile Alliance (OMA) SpecWorks, Open Connectivity Foundation (OCF), Thread Group, oneM2M, Fairhair Alliance, WiSun, Zigbee, and Bluetooth Special Interest Group with which it collaborates. The work of these organizations is extremely valuable in improving IoT security since many develop complete systems, often by reusing building blocks developed by the IETF. While summarizing their work, even at a high level, is beyond the scope of this article, we refer to these organizations where useful.
Security and Privacy Threats
We consider a simple smart-home scenario in which several IoT devices are disseminated in a home environment and interact via the network, primarily with a gateway and the cloud or some form of back end, accessed via the Internet and the gateway. IoT devices may also directly interact with one another. We consider the simplest case, in which all of the required device-to-device and device-to-gateway interactions within the home are achieved with a single link-layer hop. In other words, a scenario in which routing is not necessary within the home.
Categories of Attacks
The common approach to designing a security solution is to first conduct a threat analysis. Broadly, attacks can be categorized (as depicted in Figure 1 ) into network (or communication), software, or hardware attacks.
Historically, the IETF focused on countering network attacks and ignored software and hardware attacks. For this reason, the main threat model, as described in RFC 3552, 4 is a classical network attacker who can carry out active and passive attacks against the communication interaction. The IETF only recently started to tackle some security concerns beyond network attacks, with work on attestation, trusted execution environments, and firmware updates (see the "Firmware and Software Updates" section). 
V a lu e fo r A tt a c k e r
Privacy-related threats were added later, with RFC 6973, 5 and are now being considered in the design of protocols throughout the IETF, including IoT protocols. There is an overlap of privacy and security threats in some scenarios (for example, in a surveillance scenario), and there are some privacy-specific threats, such as data minimization and user participation. The threat of pervasive monitoring, as revealed by Snowden, certainly had a huge impact on recognizing the importance of privacy in the design of IPs, as documented by the IETF community in RFC 7258. 6 
Threat Modeling
A common technique to start threat modeling is to collect a list of assets that need to be protected. Then, the threat analysis considers what attackers can do to these assets and what the impact of those actions are. In addition to the use of a methodology, like the Microsoft STRIDE Threat Model, it is also useful to consider recommendations (or checklists) of commonly occurring security problems. An example of such a checklist can be found in the ENISA good practices for security of IoT. 3 A typical caveat, however, is that the sequences of product design decisions may introduce threats that were initially absent. Furthermore, a wildly successful IoT device will be used in unexpected ways and deployed in environments never imagined by the engineers designing the device. As such, threat modeling is difficult, and it is often necessary to examine the threats not only once, at the beginning of the product development process, but also to adjust the list of threats during the product lifecycle.
The following are three examples that illustrate the challenging nature of the threat analysis activity.
1. Consider a product that is sold to consumers and deployed in customers' home. These products are often considered physically secure because a thief breaking into someone's home is probably less interested in tampering with a smart-home product, such as a thermostat or a kettle. However, if the same customer sometimes rents his home to strangers, via services like Airbnb, the threat model has to be re-evaluated. This case illustrates a potential change in the deployment environment. Accurate threat modeling requires a good understanding of how customers use their products, how valuable the target is to the attacker, and the changing landscape of threats. 2. Consider another product that uses strong cryptography and a rock-solid security protocol to protect the integrity and confidentiality of a firmware-update mechanism. In this survey, we focus on network adversaries in which the attacker has access to the communication, a model also known as the Dolev-Yao threat model. IETF security typically discusses the threats that are considered in the design. Such an approach is useful because the purposes and details of protocols vary, although the underlying Dolev-Yao threat model is the same. For example, the threats for firmware updates are described in the Software Updates for Internet of Things (SUIT) architecture and information model documents while the transport layer security (TLS) 1.3 specification itself contains threats relevant for the TLS protocol.
Overview of ENISA Guidelines
Once an initial set of threats is collected, it is time to think about which of those threats should be dealt with, and how. Although a company may decide not to offer a technical solution to all security threats, it is useful to consult industry guidelines, such as ENISA, 3 that can help to make reasonable decisions. While many security requirements relate to the software and hardware implementation of a product, such as the boot process and hardware cryptography, some requirements relate to the communication protocol. Within the latter category, the following are the most important types of security considerations:
■ authentication and communication security ■ object security THE IoT AND SECURITY AND PRIVACY ■ authorization and access control ■ key management ■ state-of-the-art cryptography ■ restrictive communication ■ firmware and software updates.
Many of the requirements that fall into these seven groups can also be found in other best current practice guides. In fact, there is an astonishing overlap among the guidelines produced by governments, industry groups, and researchers. This gives us confidence that these guidelines indeed represent a consensus of sorts among security experts.
IETF IoT Security Standardization
The seven groups listed in the previous section can be mapped loosely to areas of work in the IETF. In the next sections, we provide a high-level overview of the ongoing standardization work.
Authentication and Communication Security
Security requirements often include the authenticity, confidentiality, and integrity of a communication interaction. Therefore, a key question is what the endpoints of this exchange are. For some use cases, it may be sufficient to offer security at the link layer because the two endpoints of the communication are topologically close to each other. For others, communication between the two endpoints involves application-layer gateways. The IETF covers communication security at the IP layer and above.
End-to-end security over User Datagram Protocol or
Transmission Control Protocol. Let's consider the use case whereby an IoT device in a smart home periodically wakes up and sends sensor readings to a cloud-based backend via an access point to which it connects over wireless.
Here, end-to-end refers to communication between the IoT device and the remote server in which constrained IoT devices typically use User Datagram Protocol (UDP) at the transport layer, more often than Transmission Control Protocol (TCP). To secure communication between two endpoints over TCP, the IETF standardized Transport Layer Security (TLS). Conversely, Datagram TLS (DTLS) secures communications over UDP. TLS/DTLS rely on a handshake setting up a security context between two endpoints, which provides authenticity, confidentiality, and integrity for subsequent communication between these endpoints over the transport protocol in use (TCP and UDP, respectively). Computationally heavy tasks are performed infrequently (as part of the handshake) while application data protection is accomplished with symmetric keys derived during the handshake. RFC 7925, 7 which defines profiles for TLS and DTLS 1.2 that are tailored for IoT devices, is used frequently.
The latest development in this area is TLS/DTLS 1.3, a new version of these standards. The final TLS 1.3 specification 8 was published is August 2018. Compared to TLS 1.2, TLS 1.3 improves performance with a more efficient handshake, modernizes ciper suites, and offers better privacy protection. Meanwhile, the DTLS 1.3 specification is being finalized. Compared to DTLS 1.2, DTLS 1.3 reduces bits over the air, provides better support for sleepy IoT devices, and improves reliability in the face of packet loss during the handshake.
Object security with COSE. Let's now consider another use case whereby an IoT software provider updates the software on an IoT device deployed in a smart home remotely, over the Internet.
In this case, end-to-end means from the software developer to the IoT device. A typical workflow is when the developer builds a firmware image, uploads it on a server, and the server eventually serves the firmware update to the IoT device, at the first occasion (e.g., the next time the latter turns up). The firmware image must be self-contained and may be stored on server(s) for an extended period of time, which may be untrustworthy. Thus, we are aiming to secure infrequent, asynchronous communication and one-shot payloads. To secure such communication end-to-end, TLS/DTLS is not appropriate. The IETF standardized concise binary object representation (CBOR) Object Signing and Encryption (COSE), 9 a different security mechanism, which we cover next.
A recent trend in IoT is to use the CBOR encoding and serialization format. For reference, compared with the JavaScript object notation ( JSON) format, CBOR was designed with (much) smaller code and message size in mind. In this context, COSE is to CBOR what JSON object signing and encryption ( JOSE) is to JSON: the signing and encryption format for CBOR-encoded data. COSE can be seen as a set of building blocks that applications use in a way they find useful (keeping an eye on code size). A device implementing a firmware update solution may, for example, rely on asymmetric cryptography and therefore would implement the signature verification capability offered by COSE and none of the other security services that use symmetric key cryptography. COSE offers several security services, including digital signatures, counter signatures, message authentication code (MAC), encryption, and rudimentary key-distribution methods.
CBOR is a fairly recent standard, and COSE only became RFC in mid-2017; therefore, Libcose and COSE-C are the only implementations tailored for use in the microcontroller environment, so far. CBOR is a good fit for securing data when the goal is to protect one-shot, self-contained payloads and data at rest.
End-to-end security over the Constrained Application
Protocol. Since the publication of the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) specification (RFC 7252) in 2014, a variety of embedded IoT stacks support it, typically in conjunction with DTLS. Compared to HTTP, CoAP aims at smaller messages, as well as smaller code size, while providing a RESTful interface, which intentionally matches well with HTTP commands.
When CoAP is deployed with CoAP proxies and application-layer gateways, TLS/DTLS cannot provide end-to-end security because a classical TLS/DTLS exchange terminates at the gateway. To secure CoAP messages, the IETF defines another communication security solution called object security for constrained restful environments (OSCORE). 10 OSCORE defines a CoAP option and a mechanism reusing COSE to protect CoAP messages. Note that OSCORE does not protect the entire CoAP message because CoAP proxies must be able to inspect part of the message.
Since OSCORE does not offer key management itself, it has to rely on a separate key-management protocol. The ACE-OAuth framework 11 can be reused to facilitate such key management. Other key-management protocols currently investigated in the IETF are ephemeral Diffie-Hellman over COSE (EDHOC) and application-layer TLS (ATLS). EDHOC is a competitor to TLS/DTLS and ATLS. Both EDHOC and ATLS allow the establishment of an OSCORE security context.
Authorization and Access Control
Users have to access many IoT devices in the smart-home environment, such as door locks, kettles, and thermostats, via everyday devices such as their smartphones and tablets. This interaction raises a number of authorization questions including: ■ How can users access the IoT device securely, without inadvertently allowing unauthorized access? ■ Is it possible to support different users or groups of users? ■ Can the access rights of one user be set differently from other users? ■ Can access-control policies be managed centrally? ■ Does the solution scale for a greater number of IoT devices? ■ How can strong authentication mechanisms be utilized?
The IETF Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) working group has developed a solution to answer these questions, based on the widely used OAuth 2.0 protocol, and brings fine-grained authorization to the IoT world. This body of work is called ACE-OAuth, 11 and the specifications are already further along, with interoperability tests taking place. OAuth 2.0 was designed with a wide range of use cases in mind, such as the web; native apps on smartphones, tablets, and desktop computers; browser-based apps; and even devices with a limited user interface, such as TVs, picture frames, and game consoles. However, a few enhancements had to be made to tailor it to the constrained IoT environment.
First, let us briefly summarize how ACE-OAuth is expected to work at a high level. The OAuth system consists of four main entities, namely, the client, the resource server, the authorization server, and the resource owner. The client wants to access a protected resource on a resource server. In a door-lock example, the client could be software running on the smartphone, and the resource server is the door lock. The authorization server is responsible for issuing tokens that allow the client to access the door lock such that the authorization policies stored on the authorization server are met. These policies are typically created by the resource owner or phrased differently. The resource owner decides who gets access to the protected resource, the door lock in our example.
The token, which is issued by the authorization server and consumed by the resource server, is called the access token. The OAuth working group standardized a token format, JSON web token ( JWT), which encodes claims in JSON, and the token itself is protected using the mechanisms developed in the IETF JOSE working group. Since the OAuth 2.0 specification does not mandate a token format, it is possible to design and use one that works best in each environment. In the case of ACE-OAuth, a counterpart to the JWT was developed with the CBOR web token (CWT), which uses CBOR instead of JSON and COSE and instead of JOSE. The result is a smaller token size.
Access tokens used in OAuth 2.0-based deployments are mostly bearer tokens. Proof-of-possession (PoP) tokens were introduced later. In the IoT environment, it is possible to use PoP tokens from the beginning. The key characteristic of a PoP token is that the token itself is associated with a symmetric or asymmetric key, and the entity presenting the token must demonstrate possession of the key. When a public key is associated with the PoP token, this means that the client must use the private key along with a digital signature when demanding access to a protected resource on a resource server. An attacker therefore needs to THE IoT AND SECURITY AND PRIVACY steal the key associated with the token in addition to the token itself. The use of PoP tokens requires an enhancement to the original OAuth 2.0 specification because extra information about the keys to be bound to the tokens must be passed around.
The second enhancement to the OAuth 2.0 specification accommodates the different protocols being used in the IoT environment. While HTTP is used for IoT communication, the CoAP and the Message Queuing Telemetry Transport protocol are also popular. OAuth 2.0 has not been developed for use with these protocols, and the necessary extensions are defined in the IETF ACE working group.
Key Management
IoT devices need several keys to enable remote management and services enablement. As explained in a white paper by the IP for Smart Objects alliance on credential management for IoT devices, 12 a common security assumption is that IoT devices have been provisioned with at least one long-term credential during manufacturing, along with trust anchors. This long-term credential is then used to provision further keys to the device in a process called bootstrapping (or, alternatively, commissioning, onboarding, or enrollment).
This new terminology hides the fact that the developed protocols provide two main steps. The first step is when the IoT device uses the manufacturer-provided credentials and the trust anchor(s) to authenticate to a bootstrap server. (There is, however, one important exception; when devices start without having credentials provisioned and use an out-of-band mechanism to obtain security guarantees. Bluetooth Low Energy, for example, uses this approach whereby a PIN entry is used as a security guarantee to skip the provisioning step.) The next step is executing an exchange to provision or derive new credentials between the IoT device and the bootstrap server. These new keys, often called operational credentials, secure the communication of the device, including data and configuration exchanges.
Many vendors and standards-developing organizations have designed protocols that provide the functionality of bootstrapping. Some of these protocols are specified for use with a particular radio technology (as the Bluetooth Low Energy example shows), and others are radio-technology agnostic. Organizations and vendors that have developed these bootstrapping techniques include OMA SpecWorks (with LwM2M), OCF, Thread Group, Intel (with their secure device onboarding), Wi-Fi Alliance (the Device Provisioning Protocol), Alljoyn, WiSun, Zigbee, and Bluetooth (Mesh). Unsurprisingly, the IETF has also developed a number of these protocols for use in IoT environments, as outlined in this survey. 13 
State-of-the-Art Cryptography
Cryptography is a conservative business. Developing a new cryptographic algorithm, writing proofs, publishing papers, and standardizing the cryptography is not enough to make it see widespread adoption, or any adoption at all. Years of community-wide review is typically required, which makes cryptography quite costly in terms of development. Therefore, an engineer given the task of developing software for an IoT product is well served to rely on off-the-shelf cryptography rather than going for the cutting edge. Resisting the urge to develop your own cryptographic algorithm is key.
Many of the IETF working groups today rely on the recommendations offered by the Internet Research Task Force Crypto Forum Research Group. The recommendations for cryptographic algorithms on IoT devices differ from those used on higher-end devices, such as desktops and servers.
For symmetric key cryptography, the industry has moved to authenticated encryption with additional data (AEAD) ciphers. IoT devices often implement the counter with CBC-MAC (CCM) in hardware, rather than the Galois/counter mode (GCM). Applications that require high data throughput prefer GCM because it can be pipelined. Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)-CCM uses the AES encrypt operation as its only primitive, which makes it suitable for compact implementations. The CCM mode of operation with AES has been put into most, if not all, IoT specifications as the preferred algorithm. To reduce the overhead caused by the MAC, CCM also supports a variant with a shortened MAC, referred to as CCM-8, which is commonly used in IoT deployments.
With TLS 1.3, GCM mode with AES-128-GCM-SHA256 is the must-implement algorithm, and the same AEAD algorithm with a longer key size, AES-256-GCM-SHA256, is a should-implement. As a backup cipher, CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256 has become popular and also is a should-implement.
For asymmetric key cryptography, rather than RivestShamir-Adleman, most IoT deployments use elliptic curve cryptography because the latter uses smaller keys for comparable security (a better fit for storage-, network-and CPU-challenged devices). The algorithm of choice for certificates today is ECDSA-SECP256r1-SHA256. For the key exchange, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) P-256 curve (secp256r1) is mandatory to implement in TLS 1.3 and the preferred choice in many IoT specifications. As an alternative, X25519 is available for key exchange and Ed25519 for digital signatures. In the future, we may see convergence in the area of symmetric cryptography algorithms used on IoT devices and on the general Internet with ChaCha20 and Poly1305.
Restricting Communication
Most IoT devices are built to fulfill a specific purpose, typically to collect sensor input, process it, and act on the results. In edge or fog computing, even sensor fusion is often outsourced to a gateway, or it is delegated to the server-side infrastructure. Naturally, the communication interaction of such IoT devices is also limited, particularly since these devices have limited RAM, which prevents communication with multiple hosts concurrently.
The earlier work of the IETF Network Endpoint Assessment (NEA) working group was to assess and restrict the communication of endpoints with respect to an organization's policies. However, it turned out to be difficult to write and maintain policies for endpoints with versatile communication interaction such as laptops and desktops. Hence, in the end, the NEA standardization work had less of a security impact than expected.
Recently, with the much simpler communication interaction of IoT devices, the idea of restricting the communication of these devices surfaced again. An organization interested in formulating a policy regarding what an IoT device is allowed to do faces a challenge in that it requires some analysis to determine which protocols a device is using and with which hosts it is communicating on the Internet. Only the company developing the final product has complete information available about the communication behavior since it is in full control of developing (or selecting) the software stack.
Although IoT security recommendations highlight the need to remove unused services, network operators still inherently distrust the manufacturers of these devices. The current assumption seems to be that IoT devices will not be developed with security in mind. This lack of confidence in the ability to develop secure IoT devices has led network equipment manufacturers, network operators, and security start-ups to develop various schemes for learning whether an IoT device behaves correctly. While products on the market use some form of deep-packet inspection and analysis-of-communication interactions by intermediaries somewhere in the access network, the standardized solution expects the equipment manufacturer to publish manufacturer usage descriptions (MUD). 14 The MUD documents offer information about the communication interaction of the IoT device. These MUD files are communicated from the IoT device to the network using the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP). Alternatively, a uniform resource locator pointing to a MUD file can be carried as an extension in certificates. Equipment in the network then fetches these MUD files and uses the machine-readable description to create firewall policies automatically. For example, it is expected that a device that misbehaves due to an attack will be firewalled, or at least that alerts will be generated. A manufacturer has to update these MUD files for each product whenever the communication interaction changes, such as when the device interacts with different servers or uses alternative communication protocols.
At the time of this writing, the standardization work on MUD is largely completed, and it remains to be seen whether manufacturers who previously did not care about implementing a firmware update solution and the like can now be convinced to publish MUD files about their products in a timely fashion. At the same time, many companies are trying hard to improve the security of endpoints with new hardware security mechanisms and with readily available open source code that takes most of the difficult security programming out of the hands of developers.
Firmware and Software Updates
Providing a firmware update solution for IoT devices is essential for dealing with bugs and the changing environment. While this seems obvious, we still see many devices on the market that do not enable updating their code. Best current practice guides demand not only the ability to update firmware but also the ability to do so securely. In 2017, the IETF formed the SUIT working group to standardize an IoT firmware update solution. The initial starting point was to outline the architecture and the metadata describing a firmware image along with its security mechanism. 15 The metadata contained in a data structure are protected, at least against modifications, and called a manifest. IoT device-management solutions, such as LwM2M, can then be used to deliver the manifest and the firmware image to IoT devices. The manifest contains several elements to instruct an IoT device to install only firmware that comes from an authorized source, has not been modified, is (optionally) confidentiality protected, is suitable for the hardware, and meets various other conditions.
The IETF SUIT aims to cover a wide range of use cases, not only because the IoT market is quite diverse THE IoT AND SECURITY AND PRIVACY in its deployment needs, but also because of the hardware being used. Since many IoT devices contain multiple microcontrollers to perform different tasks, such as radio communication and application processing, the manifest also has to provide an indication of which microcontroller must be updated. Likewise, a single microcontroller may have software from different vendors, such as a Bluetooth software stack from the chip manufacturer and application code from a developer. Transferring large firmware images can be a challenge for low-power radio technologies. Therefore, some vendors prefer to use differential updates or to update selected components instead. The manifest also has to cover these use cases.
Dealing with different versions of firmware over the lifetime of the device is another requirement. These scenarios require some form of dependency mechanism and version management. The use of an encrypted firmware image is also becoming more popular because it reduces the attack surface, since knowledge of the code running on an IoT device, even if it must be reverse engineered, gives an attacker a lot of additional insight. Obtaining a firmware image is often the first task in an attack chain. While the standardization process for IETF SUIT is still ongoing, the group is interested in reusing existing building blocks, such as CBOR and COSE, to encode and protect firmware images, respectively.
The IETF SUIT working group is related to the Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning (TEEP) working group, since the goal in both cases is to update code on a device. The main difference between SUIT and TEEP is that TEEP focuses on hardware that uses Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), such as Arm TrustZone or Intel SGX. A TEE is designed to provide a hardware-isolation mechanism to separate a regular operating system from security-sensitive application components, such as key storage. Therefore, the goal is to update code that runs inside these TEEs, the so-called trusted apps. Most of the hardware equipped with a TEE today, such as gateway devices in IoT deployments, is rather powerful compared to a constrained IoT device. However, with the recent addition of TrustZone technology to the Arm M-profile architecture, constrained microcontrollers are gaining trusted execution capabilities.
The TEEP working group is standardizing an application-layer protocol, the Open Trust Protocol (OTrP), 16 which manages the interaction between a TEE and a server-side component, the trusted application manager (TAM), to query the TEE for installed trusted apps and to manage the lifecycle of these trusted apps. Trusted apps are only installed if the TAM has successfully attested the hardware and software functionality of the TEE. The design of OTrP is complicated by the interaction of the trusted app and code running on the regular operating system; the different ways to deliver software to higher-end devices, such as phones and tablets; and because devices may be equipped with multiple TEEs. The group agreed to reuse the SUIT manifest for the actual software update and the attestation mechanism developed in a recently established working group, the Remote Attestation Procedures (RATS) working group.
The RATS working group aims to standardize a container for attestation information. The most promising candidate is the entity attestation token format, which introduces attestation-specific claims for use in the CWT structure. The promise of the work is to enable IoT devices to communicate information about the manufacturer, hardware security features used, and hashes computed over the bootloader and firmware code of the device to a communication party, opening up additional decision-making possibilities.
Discussion
While the IETF is obsessed with protocol design, the ENISA baseline security recommendations for the IoT go beyond and concern processes, software, and hardware-related properties. Considering attacks on IoT systems, we see that the most common types of attacks and vulnerabilities can be addressed by the IETF IoT security standards: ■ inadequate software update mechanism ■ missing key-management and default passwords ■ unauthorized access to configuration data ■ missing communication security ■ physical attacks.
Obviously, physical attacks are largely outside the scope of the IETF. Furthermore, reference standardization is ongoing and must be completed before the results can be applied to products. Beyond these trivial observations, what are the gaps?
Integration Challenges
To design a secure IoT product, a developer needs to put various building blocks together correctly, to produce a usable system. Historically, this systems-level approach has not been handled by the IETF, which is more focused on developing the building blocks. As such, for a complete IoT device-management solution, engineers must look elsewhere, to the OMA SpecWorks or the OCF, for example. It can be confusing to engineers who are developing products to suddenly find out that the building blocks developed by the IETF do not fit nicely into the systems developed by these other organizations.
Implementation Gaps
Implementations for constrained IoT devices often lag behind standardization. Existing open source code is often incomplete, difficult to integrate into off-theshelf hardware, and has not been well tested and peer reviewed. It is not uncommon to see IoT-centric protocols implemented in Java or Python, while the language of choice for embedded developers today is C or C++.
Integrating security into constrained IoT devices requires a lot of know-how. Due to the constraints of these devices, many layers of abstraction offered by high-end devices that run full-blown operating systems, like Linux, are not available. Therefore, developers have to familiarize themselves with the features of their hardware and with how to access the various features, such as the random number generator, the memory protection unit, or hardware cryptography. Many IoT operating systems even lack memory-safety and isolation features.
To facilitate bridging implementation gaps, new standards in the area of APIs in the style of the Cortex Microcontroller Software Interface Standard could be useful. In the context of IETF, one might wonder whether it would make sense to shift attention from communication security to endpoint security and to aim at playing a bigger role in developing such standards.
Open Standards Versus Proprietary Solutions
Network security technologies can typically be used in all verticals, but the smart-home market is unique. Getting standardized security technologies deployed in the home market is challenging because many of the key players are still under the impression that they will dominate the market in the near future and, in the belief that the winner takes all, they do not consider the need to interoperate with any other product. If interoperation exists, it is typically through proprietary mechanisms with application-layer gateways.
We do expect this situation to change over time, as many of the IoT protocols and security features become commodities rather than differentiators. It is also likely that end users will expect to have IoT devices that interoperate rather than having each product family interconnected only through a gateway that requires yet another device in the household.
Note that interoperability and the use of open standards do not necessarily make it easier for invaders to attack a larger number of devices. The number of reviews in a standards developing organization typically increases the quality of both the technical specification and the (multiple) implementations of that specification.
Choosing a Communication Security Paradigm
So far, we see the use of link-layer security mechanisms and DTLS/TLS in IoT deployments. Object-level security is used very selectively in combination with DTLS/TLS, but often in a proprietary way. The adoption of IPsec/IKE and HIP has failed due to the lack of product-quality embedded stacks. It remains to be seen whether OSCORE will be successful in the market, particularly since the new version of TLS/DTLS 1.3 is now available also. Intuitively, an object-level security solution, like COSE, is easier to deploy than OSCORE because it is independent of the underlying transport, and, in many deployments, the end-to-end path experiences a lot of protocol translation, often with considerable changes in API semantics. Any end-to-end security solution must consider what the endpoints are, because protecting sensor readings and other application data may not always be possible when the gateway is supposed to perform algorithmic computations, such as machine learning.
Future-Proof Cryptography for IoT
The work on postquantum cryptography is a development worth noting in light of the fact that many studies have focused on creating algorithms that resist large, specialized quantum computers. While many of the algorithms are still being evaluated, such as part of the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography standardization effort, there are concerns that some IoT devices that are expected to have a lifetime of 10-20 years will encounter problems because of the progress made with quantum computers. Therefore, the use of new algorithms (e.g., hash-based signatures, considered to be postquantum safe) has been suggested as a way to secure firmware updates. However, there also are challenges with these new algorithms. Many of the postquantum algorithms are characterized by slower performance, larger key size, or a larger signature size than conventional public key-nicryptography schemes.
Choosing a Key-Management Solution
Key management is an important aspect in IoT security, including for establishing communication security and bootstrapping. As shown in this survey, there are many choices available, which makes it difficult to deploy technology that interoperates. This is an area of ongoing work. It is not clear whether these different mechanisms are likely to converge and how many of them will see widespread deployment, or any deployment at all. Although many of the proposals THE IoT AND SECURITY AND PRIVACY are similar at a high level, there are some subtle differences in their designs. For example, some allow only certain credential types to be used, work only with specific authentication and key exchange protocols (such as TLS/DTLS), make assumptions regarding connectivity and intermediaries, or work only on specific layers in the protocol stack. Because each proposal introduces new terminology, comparing them is often challenging. In summary, developments in the area of key management beg the question of whether more choice is always better for developers. D esigning a secure IoT product is difficult, as demonstrated by press releases about hacked IoT products. Guidelines and recommendations for securing IoT devices have recently been published. In this article, we surveyed categories of security protocols standardized by IETF that are specifically designed for constrained IoT devices, for authentication and communication security, object security, authorization and access control, key management, cryptography, and restricting communication, as well as software updates. These categories are based on ENISA's list of IoT security recommendations.
In this article, we ponder the possibility of developing a reasonably secure product based on the standardization work done by IETF. As far as the scope of the IETF work goes, we believe this is possible: standardization work has advanced to a point that there typically is no need for homegrown solutions (which often are less secure).
However, there are challenges and gaps as well. At the time of writing, some standardization work was not yet completed. In other cases, standardization work is ahead of implementations. Developers often face a lot of pain when integrating security libraries into their hardware of choice. In general, few security libraries are developer-friendly and available for use with the large number of IoT operating systems. More resources are needed to implement high-quality embedded libraries. Even if a protocol specification is sound, it is only secure in practice when it is implemented without fundamental bugs. In particular, a solid implementation of cryptography requires highly specialized work, since subtleties in specifications are common and naïve protocol implementation (not to mention bugs) can lead to side-channel vulnerabilities. Recommendations thus point toward using well-tested and widely used libraries (instead of homegrown implementations). Since even well-tested security protocol implementations have bugs, it is important to not underplay the importance of firmware updates, which are a crucial security feature of a product.
Last but not least, it is worth noting that there is still configuration and optimization potential within each of the IETF-developed security protocols, assuming an engineer has security know-how and is familiar with embedded development. 
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